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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IRENE ERICKSON, ~ 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v Case No. 
s. ( 10914 
ORAN L. BEARDALL, ) 
Def end ant and. Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEl\IENT OF .THE KIND OF CASE 
Appellant and Respondent entered into a stipula· 
tion prior to a divorce. Appellant subsequently obtained 
the divorce and said stipulation was accepted by the 
Court and made a part of the Divorce Decree. The 
stipulation provided among other things that the Ap· 
pellant would pay three fairly large family obligations. 
However, Appellant failed to make payments and then 
filed for Bankruptcy, listing said three obligations in 
.1 
his bankruptcy petition. Plaintiff-Respondent sued lo 
recover the amount of the payments. 
The primary question invoked in this litigation 
is whether or not the obligations covered by the stipu-
lation and Divorce Decree would be a debt provable 
in bankruptcy, or whether it would not be dischargeahle 
under Section 17, Title 11, Section 35, U.S.C.A. (Fed-
eral Bankruptcy Act) for the reason that it was for 
the maintenance or support of wife. 
The case was tried before .Judge .Maurice Harding 
of the Fourth Judicial District Court and Judgment 
was granted to the Plaintiff-Respondent. The Court 
in its Findings of Fact specifically found that said 
obligations were for maintenance and support of De-
fendant-Appellant's wife, and were not provable debts 
which would be dischargeable under Section 17 of the 
Federal Bankruptcy Act. 
From this Judgment the Defendant appealed. 
RELIEl' SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the District Court 
Findings of Fact and Judgment. Plaintiff seeks to ha Ye 
the Findings of Fact and Judgment affirmed. 
2 
STATE_MENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts as set forth in Appellant's 
Brief is generally correct but lacks detail in many 
material areas which should be brought to the attention 
of the Court. Respondent, therefore, will make a more 
detailed statement and set forth the Facts as developed 
by both parties. 
The Appellant and Respondent were married on 
the 31st day of l\Iay, 1963, and lived together until 
August, 1965. (Tr. p. 5, 31). Appellant brought two 
minor children into the new family relationship, (Tr. 
p. :Z5) and Respondent one. Respondent's son had a 
heart condition and was unable to work. (Tr. p. 18). 
They all lived in Respondent's home. (Tr. p. 31). 
Respondent ·was a widow, age 47, at the time of 
the marriage. She had been a housewife and had not 
worked outside the home virtually all of her married 
life, and had developed no employment skills to enable 
her to obtain a worthwhile job. She lived on Social 
Security and had savings in the approximate amount 
of $4700.00. (Tr. p. 5, 16, 18). These savings were 
completely depleted before the parties separated, and 
i11 addition, three sizeable family obligations were in-
curred. 
DiYorce proceedings were started by Appellant in 
ihe latter part of August, 1965. In September, 1965, a 
;,cttlement was worked out by Counsel for the parties, 
and a stipulation executed (Tr. p. 5, 14), which pro-
rnled among other things as follows: 
3 
Defendant in Divorce action (Respondent) was 
to be awarded a 1965 Yaliant automobile which had an 
unpaid indebtedness to Zions l<-..irst National Bank iu 
an amount of $2,043.10. Plaintiff (Appellant) agreecl 
to make all payments on this bill. Also he was to be 
awarded the 1964 Dodge Truck, although title was to 
be withheld from him until all bills covered by the 
Stipulation were fully paid. 
Plaintiff in Divorce action (Appellant) \Vas to sig11 
a Promissory Note in the amount of $1265.85, carry 
6% interest and payable at the rate of $50.00 per month. 
Plaintiff (Appellant) was to pay off a family 
obligation to First l<'ederal Savings and Loan Asso-
ciation for siding on Defendant (Respondent's) home 
in the amount of $1,379.83; and also a family obligation 
to City Finance Company of .Murray in the amount 
of $471.64 as the balance due on an Encydopedia set 
and a color T.V. 
Defendant (Respondent's) Social Security check 
payable to her as a widow was cancelled upon her mar-
riage. It could be reinstated when the divorce became 
final, so until that time, a cash monthly alimony of 
$100.00 per month ·was to be paid by Plaintiff (Ap-
pellant). 
The Stipulation contained this further provision: 
"Plaintiff hereby assumes and agrees to pay in full all 
of these obligations. and will not allow them to become 
4 
delinquent and will save the Defendant harmless from 
any suit or action appertaining to any or all of those 
three bills." 
This Stipulation was made a part of the Divorce 
Decree granted on the 27th day of October, 1965. 
It is significant to note that Plaintiff (Appellant) 
paid a small amount on the Promissory Note and finally 
turned over his equity in the Dodge truck to meet this 
obligation. The evidence does not show that he made 
a single payment, however, on the other three obliga-
tions. Finally, the Bank repossessed the automobile 
about two months before Appellant filed for bank-
ruptcy, much to the discomfort of the Respondent, who 
had to quit her out-of-town employment for lack of 
transportation. (Tr. p. 11, 12). She then had to cash 
in an insurance policy to pay off the siding obligation 
to the Savings and Loan Co. (Tr. p. 6) and had to 
make back payments current and thereafter, make 
monthly payments at the Finance Co. 
Appellant, without making payments on the three 
obligations, filed for bankruptcy on July 28, 1966. His 
only creditors listed in the bankruptcy petition were 
the three covered by the Stipulation and Divorce Decree 
to Zion's }"'irst National Bank, First Federal Savings 
and Loan, and City Finance Co. of Murray, and one 
small additional bill to Dr. Kent Davis for dental work 
(lune to Appellant's son Phillip in the amount of $84.00. 
(Tr. p. 15). 
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'Vhen Appellant refused to reimburse Respond-
ent on these obligations, a complaint was filed, and 
action started to force payment. 
Appellant answered alleging the obligations were 
discharged in bankruptcy. Various motions were heard 
and aP amended complaint filed prior to trial. Re-
spondent also remarried shortly before trial time. 
At the non-jury trial before Judge .Maurice Hard-
ing, the Court gave Judgment to the Respondent on 
three causes of action, after dismissing the Cause of 
Action on the note as having been satisfied. 
The Findings of Fact by the Trial Court pertinent 
to the issues in question are as follows: 
1. That during the month of September, 196.'i, 
Plaintiff and Defendant e'ntered into a stipulation and 
settlement agreement in their divorce action. Such 
stipulation was accepted by the Court and made a part 
of the f~indings and Decree of Divorce in Civil Case 
No. 28,806, and were signed by Judge R. L. Tuckett 
on the 27th day of October, 1965. 
2. That the Defendant, without having made any 
payments on the obligations covered in Plaintiff's 2nd, 
3rd, and 4th Causes of Action, filed for Bankruptcy 
on the 28th day of July, 1966, and listed therein, as 
being all of his debts, the obligations contained in the 
above-mentioned stipulation and Decree which consti-
tuted Plaintiff's 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Causes of Action 
herein, together with only one other debt, a $84.00 bill 
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to Dr. Davis, a dentist for dental work done on De-
fcudanfs own son. 
Second Cause of Action 
4. That the Defendant, under the terms of the 
Stipulation and Decree above-mentioned, agreed to 
pay in full an obligation with the :First }"ederal Savings 
and Loan Association for siding on Plaintiff's home at 
Lehi, Utah, with a balance owing of $1,379.83. That 
the Defendant defaulted in the payment of this account, 
making it necessary for the Plaintiff to completely 
pay off the account, which was done on July 7, 1966, 
for a settlement figure of $1,225.34, and thereby mak-
ing Plaintiff entitled to interest at the rate of 6% per 
annum from July 7, 1966, and further interest upon 
the total award from date hereof until paid at the rate 
of 8% per annum. 
5. That the Defendant filed for Bankruptcy on 
the 28th day of July, 1966, and listed the obligation 
coyered in Plaintiff's 2nd Cause of Action, but that said 
obligation, incurred originally for siding for Plaintiff's 
home at Lehi, Utah, is for Maintenance and Support 
of Defendant's wife, and is not a provable debt which 
would be dischargeable under Section I 7 of the Federal 
Bankruptcy Act. 
Third Cause of Action 
6. That the Defendant, under the terms of the 
Stipulation and Decree above-mentioned, agreed to pay 
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in full an obligation to the City Finance Company of 
.Murray for a set of encyclopedias and a television set, 
in the amount of $471.64. That the Defendant defaulted 
in the payment of this account, making it necessary for 
the Plaintiff to completely assume this obligation, and 
thereby making Plaintiff entitled to interest thereon 
from the date of said stipulation, September 16, 1965 
at the rate of 6% per annum on $471.64, and further 
interest upon the total award from date hereof until 
paid at the rate of 8% per annum. 
7. That the Defendant filed for bankruptcy on 
the 28th day of July, l!J66, and listed the obligation 
covered in Plaintiff's 3rd Cause of Action but that said 
obligation is for :Maintenance and Support of De-
fendant's wife in the manner to which Plaintiff was 
accustomed, and is not a provable debt which would be 
dischargeable under Section 17 of the Federal Bank-
ruptcy Act. 
Fourth Cause of Action 
8. That the Defendant under the terms of the 
stip~lation and decree above mentioned agreed to pay 
in full an obligation with Zions First National Bank 
for a 1065 Yaliant Automobile which was essential for 
Plaintiff's family use and employment, with a balance 
owing of $2,043.10. That the Defendant defaulted i11 
the payment of this account, and said Company came 
and repossessed said automobile, thus causing a loss to 
Plaintiff of $2 ,043. l 0, together with interest thereon 
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as the payments fell due in the amount of 6% per an-
num, and further interest upon the total award from 
<late hereof until paid at the rate of 8/1c per annum. 
U. That the Defendant filed for bankruptcy on 
the 28th day of July, 1966, and listed the obligation 
i11 Plaintiff's 4th Cause of Action but that said obli-
gation is for .Maintenance and Support of Defendant's 
wife in the nature of a necessary family vehicle, and is 
not a prornble rlebt which would be dischargeable under 
Section 17 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act. 
STATE~IENT OF POINTS 
Throughout the remainder of this brief, Defendant 
will be referred to as Appellant and Plaintiff as Re-
spondent. Respondent will argue the Appellant's points 
in the order in which they appear in Appellant's brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD AND 
THE APPLICABLE LAW SUPPORTS THE 
TRIAL COURT FINDING THAT THE 
0 B L I G A T I 0 N S TO FIRST FEDERAL 
SAYINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, CITY 
FINANCE COMP ANY OF MURRAY, AND 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK ARE FOR 
9 
l\IAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT OF THE 
RESPONDENT AND THEREFORE NOT 
DISCHARGEABLE IN BANKRUPTCY. 
Section 17 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act,. Title 
11, Bankruptcy Section 35, U.S.C.A., contains the fol-
lowing provision: 
"Debts not affected by a discharge. a. A dis-
charge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt 
from all of his provable debts, whether allowable 
in full or in part, except such as ( 1) ... ; (2) 
... or for alimony due or to become due, or for 
mamtenance or support of wife or child, ... " 
A definition of the word "support" might be help-
ful to the Court in arriving at its decision. Ballentine's 
Law Dictionary, 2nd Edition, states: Support "means 
maintenance, subsistence, or an income sufficient for 
the support of a family, and maintenance means sus-
tenance, support by means of supplies of food, cloth-
ing, and other conveniences." 
The Respondent maintains and the District Court 
so held, that the obligations incurred during the mar-
riage of the parties hereto for siding for the home, set 
of encyclopedias and television set, and automobile 
were for maintenance and support of Appellant's wife. 
"\Ve are concerned with the facts as they existed 
at the time Appellant and Respondent entered into a 
Stipulation, paving the way a short time later for a 
Divorce Decree. 
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After two years of marriage to Appellant, the 
Hcspondent no longer possessed approximately $4,-
700.00 she had prior to marriage. All was gone, and in 
addition, three sizeable family obligations had been in-
curred, all of which were to have been paid out of his 
wages. The following testimony was given at the trial: 
(l\Ir. Hinton) "Q Now, these bills, when 
they were incurred, were they family obliga-
tions? 
(Irene Erickson Robison) "A Yes." 
( .l\Ir. Hinton) "Q Were they to be paid out 
of his wages?" 
(Irene Erickson Robison) "A Yes." 
(l\Ir. Hinton "Q Did you have any way, on 
your own, of paying them?" 
(Irene Erickson Ro bison) "A No." (Tr. 
p. 29). 
She was not trained for employment outside of 
the home, and thus, without help, could not provide for 
her needs. Also her minor son had a heart ailment and 
was unable to work. (Tr. p.18) . 
In addition, Respondent had mothered and cared 
for Appellant's two minor sons during all of this period, 
and all lived in her home. 
This home was livable, although it needed paint-
ing, but rather than paint, Appellant talked Respond-
ent into having siding placed on it instead, thus in-
curring the indebtedness to First Federal Savings and 
11 
Loan Co., on which there was $1,379.83 still due. ('l'r. 
p. 29, 30). 
Respondent, at the time of marriage, owned a 
1962 Valiant, which was fully paid for. The addition 
of her new husband and two step-sons to the family 
made the car small for the family needs, and so it was 
traded in on the 1965 Yaliant Station Wagon. The 
indebtedness thus incurred was the $2,043.10 owed to 
Zions F'irst National Bank. (Tr. p. 11) . 
During the marriage, a color TV set and encyclo-
pedia set were purchased for family use and enjoyment 
and financed through City Finance Company of l\Iur-
ray. The balance owed was $471.64. 
It should be observed that all three obligations at 
the time of the divorce in no way enhanced or increased 
Respondent's standard of living, but simply continued 
it in the manner to which she had been accustomed. 
Her sole living was calculated to be her small 
Social Security check, after it was reinstated, unless 
she could find employment. There was no way she could 
have paid off these three obligations. 
The follmving statement from the record is en-
lightening: 
( l\lr. Hinton) "Q 'Vhen the Stipulation was 
entered into in regard to the Divorce action, 
would you have been able to maintain yourself 
out of what you were receiving if he failed to 
pay these obligations?" 
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(Irene Erickson Robison) "A No." 
(:Mr. Hinton "Q 'Vhen yon entered into this 
agreement, what did you have in mind?" 
(Irene Ericbon Robison) "A \Vell, I fig-
ured he would pay those bills like the Stipulation 
ordered him to." 
( .l\Ir. Hinton) "Q And you felt you could 
get along?" 
(Irene Erickson Robison) "A And I felt I 
could get along on the Social Security if I had 
no bills to pay." (Tr. p. 19). 
Appellant has attempted to make a strong issue of 
the fact that the payments promised to be made in the 
divorce stipulation closely approximately the $4700.00 
plus odd dollars Respondent had at the time of mar-
riage, and thus was a reimbursement and property 
settlement rather than for support and maintenance. 
The best answer to this argument is in the testi-
mony of the Respondent, who was a party to the divorce. 
(~Ir. Hinton) "Q Now, on cross-examina-
tion, you indicated that this settlement was to 
reimburse you for funds that you had before the 
marriage. 'Vas there more involved to it than 
that?" 
(Irene Erickson Robison) "A Well, yes. 
The money that I had spent on his bills, and 
that, there was the interest on that that I fig-
ured in on that,too." 
(l\Ir. Hinton) "Q And what about support 
and maintenance?" 
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(Irene Erickson Robison) "A 1 don't gel 
,,·hat you mean." 
(~Ir. Hinton) "Q 
tion to support you ( 
decision?" 
'Vhat about his obliga-
Did this figure in your 
(Irene Erickson Robison) '·A Yes, became 
you just can't maintain a place on that small 
amount of money that I was getting." 
( .l\Ir. Ilinton) "Q This was uot only a re-
payment?" 
(Irene Erickson Robio-;on) "A It was for 
support. Actually, you can't mamtam a house 
and that on $160.00 a month, and pay your utili-
ties and everything." (Tr. p. 30, 31). 
In the case of In re Hollister, (DCNY 1942) 
17 I•""'. Supp. IJJ., aft" d per curiam, ( CCA-2, 1943) 132 
F. 2nd 861, it was held that: 
"Although a bankupt's indebtedness to his 
wife as it existed prenous to an adjudication in 
bankruptcy would haYe been discharged by the 
bankruptcy, -when the parties agreed that pay-
ment of the indebtedness should serve to release 
the bankrupt from his duty to support his wife, 
upon the granting of a diYorce, it no longer con-
stituted payment of a simple debt, for the debt 
had been converted into a contract for the main-
tenance and support of the wife within the mean-
ing of Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act." 
See also Battles Y. Battles, (Okla. 1952) 239 P. 
2nd 794. 
8B - Corpus Juris Secundum, 4<8 Bankruptcy Para-
graph 570: 
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"lJ nder the Bankruptcy Act, a discharge in 
Bankruptcy does not release the bankrupt from 
a debt for alimony due, or to become due, or for 
ma!ntenance or support of his wife or child, 
claims of this nature come within the exception, 
even though they have been embodied in agree-
ments between the parties, and even though they 
have been reduced to judgment. 
Claims under agreements for maintenance 
and support are within the exceptions even 
though the agreement contains other features not 
falling strictly within the exception; . " 
The matter of Avery (C.C.A. 6th, 1940) 44 Am. 
B. R .. (N.S.) 168, 114 F. 2nd 768, states as follows: 
"\Vhere a judgment against the bankrupt in 
favor of his divorced wife represented the 
amount of arrears due under a divorce decree 
which confirmed a "property settlement" between 
the parties, and such settlement contract shows 
that the amounts to be paid thereunder were 
intended for alimony and for the support and 
maintenance of the wife, the bankrupt cannot 
successfully contend that such judgment was 
discharged in bankruptcy." 
Nadler' s "The Law of Bankruptcy", 2nd Edition, 
Paragraph 791, page 661, states: 
"Akin to claims for alimony are liabilities for 
the 'maintenance or support of wife or child'. 141 
Date of payment with reference to divorce or 
to bankruptcy is immaterial. 142 Nor does it mat-
ter whether the obligation is made part of a 
Court decree143 or is the subject matter of a 
settlement agreement between husband and 
15 
y;·ife.144 He.re, too, there is no merger iuto a 
sub~equent judgment, and the Court may go 
belund the .Judgment. 14 '' Since the liability for 
maintenance or support is not a debt, b~1t i.) 
founded upon a legal duty, it is still such 311 
un.dischargeable obligation, even though the 
child whose maintenance is involved is illegiti-
mate and the order to pay was issued in a bas-
tardly proceeding".146 
Another fact stands out in the events which brought 
about this lawsuit, the bankruptcy filing on the part 
of the Appellant. It occurred on July 28, 1966. How-
ever, from the date of the Divorce Stipulation in Sep-
tember, 1965, until the bankruptcy filing, there is no 
eYidence that he paid any payments on the three ac-
counts. Also, these three bills and one other, a small 
dentist bill for $84.00 for work done on his own son's 
teeth, constitute all of the creditors listed in the bank-
ruptcy proceeding. One could easily surmise that he 
entered into the stipulation in bad faith, never intend-
ing to pay, and imposing the entire burden of family 
support and maintenance and debts upon Respondent. 
A summary of the opinion in the case of In Re 
.Martin, United States District Court, Southern Dis-
trict, Central Division (July 14, 1964) C.C.H. Section 
.J.1-13, Case No. 61,138, states as follows: 
"A bankrupt was denied an injunction to stay 
state court proceedings which were instituted by 
his former '" ifo to collect monthly payments pro· 
vided by the property settlement agreement in 
their divorce action where the language of the 
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agreement was in effect an agreement for sup-
port and not a division of community property 
as labeled and where there was strong evidence 
that the bankrupt had not acted in good faith. 
Three weeks af tcr the divorce the bankrupt filed 
a voluntary petition of bankruptcy, listing his 
former wife as the only creditor. Until the di-
Yorce had been made final he had regularly paid 
the $500 per month amount stipulated in the 
property settlement agreement. The bankrupt 
contended that because the payments due were 
labeled property settlements and was part of 
a division of community property that the pay-
ments due should have been discharged with 
the filing of bankruptcy and that his former 
wife should be enjoined from bringing suit to 
collect these payments. The court rejected this 
contention on several grounds. First, the bank-
rupt had "unclean hands", because he filed his 
petition in bankruptcy in bad faith. The bank· 
rupt was not insolvent at the time of filing, and 
he attempted to transfer title to a piece of prop-
erty valued at $4000 to his attorney for $900 
consideration seven days before the filing of the 
petition. He also had $900 in cash on his person 
when he listed his wife as the only creditor to an 
amount of $345. The court said that they would 
not interfere in his behalf or grant him any relief, 
because he had violated the moral concepts of 
good conscience. The court also denied relief on 
the basis of its interpretation of the property 
settlement agreement under the Bankruptcy 
Act." 
Appellant's efforts in his brief to discount this 
Court's ruling in the case of Lyon vs. Lyon (1949) 
115 L1'tah 466, 206 P. 2nd 148, are of no avail. His 
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attempts to distinguish are without merit as they en-
deavor to circunffent the natural and legal duty the 
husband has to support his wife. 
The Lyon case seems to be directly in point with 
the fact situation of the present case. The Court's de-
termination that even though a divorce decree provided 
for a property settlement in accordance with the stipu-
lation of the parties, such property settlement was really 
an award for the support and maintenance of the de-
fendant's wife "in the nature of alimony" and therefore 
the obligation thereunder was not discharged in bank-
ruptcy. This would also seem to be a proper determi-
nation in the instant case. 
On the other hand, Appellant's reliance upon the 
more recent Utah case of Fife vs. Fife ( 1954), 1 Utah 
2nd 281, 265 P. 2nd 642, comes through a misinter-
pretation of the reason for the Courf s decision. The 
fact of the matter is that there was never a valid mar-
riage and hence no duty or requirement of alimony, 
support or maintenance. The ostensible marriage re-
lationship "\Vas severed by an annulment rather than 
by diYorce. Naturally, under these particular facts, the 
obligations would be dischargeable in bankruptcy. 
Hov,ever, the decision would undoubtedly have been 
entirely different had the marriage been valid rather 
than void. 
The Court concluded its decision with this state-
ment, "\\Te confine our conclusion to the facts of this 
case alone", ... Thus, there was no effort to overrule. 
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distinguish, or even criticize the Court's 1949 ruling 
in the Lyon case,and, therefore, it still stands. 
Appellant, if the cases are properly understood, 
Jias no Gtah authorities to back up his position, and 
the decisions from other states should not be too persu-
asive. It should be noted, too, that most of Appellant's 
out-of-state citations are very old: In Re Ostrander, 
139 F. 592 ( 1905); Schellenberg v .. Mullaney, 112 App. 
Div. 384, 98 N.Y.S. 432, ( 1906); In Loman v. Locke, 
134 N.E. 343, (1921) or were from California. 
The quoted California case in Appellant's brief, 
Smalley Ys. Smalley ( 1959) 176 Cal. App. 2nd (Adv. 
4U2) , 1 Cal R ptr 440, and is the principal case in 7 4 
ALR 2nd 7 56, states: 
'·It has been squarely held in California that, 
where the parties have entered into a property 
settlement agreement whereby payments are 
thereafter to be made to the wife, 1Wt for support 
but in settlement of property rights, the dis-
charge in bankruptcy of the husband discharges 
the debt." 
This citation gives the other California cases cited 
in Appellant's brief as following this same rule: Tropp 
v. Tropp, 129 Cal App 62, 18 P 2nd 385; Fernandes 
v. Pitta, 47 Cal App 2nd 248, 117 P 2nd 728. In the 
latter case, it "stated in paragraph 15 that the contract 
'~·as made 'solely for the purpose of settling rights of 
property and support which arise between the parties 
on account of their present separation'." 
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In contrast the California rule as held in Remon-
dino 1. Remoudiuo, 41 Cal. App. 2nd 208, 106, P 2nd 
~37, as that: 
·'An alimony judgment or a judgment which 
can properly be constr.ued as being for alimony 
zs nut affected by a discharge in bankruptcy." 
Also, the annotation in 7 4 ALR 2nd 760, states: 
'·E,,.en though the agreement between the 
spomes was called a property settlement and 
\Vas referred to a.c, such in the decree din!l'cmg 
the parties, the obligation thereunder "·as held 
not dischargeable in bankruptcy, where th· 
agreement '"as m substance one f•ff mainteua111:r 
and support." I3lair v. Blair ( 10-11) -1-! Cal App 
2nd 140, 112 P2nd 39. 
The contrasting rules seem to be as stated i!: ·n 
A.L.R. 2nd 759, paragaraph 2 (a): 
"In a number of cases it has been held or rec-
ognized that a property settlement agreement 
between spouses is dischargeable in bankruptc:·. 
at least where it is truly or substantially a prop-
erty s~ttlement agreement, an? not an a*'reement 
for alnnony. support or mamtenance. 
Paragraph 2 (b) states: 
"But where the agreement is substantially une 
for alimony, maintenance, or support, it ha, 
been held or recognized that the obligation there-
under is not dischargeable in bankruptcy.'' 
These cases all turn on a clearly established prop· 
erty settlement, whereas Respondent maintains in the 
instant case that it was not a property settlement but 
was in the nature of support and maintenance. In light 
1Jf facts of this ease, and all of the cases and the texts 
cited, the Court ''··ould have more than ample support 
to rule that Appdlant's obligations could not be dis-
charged by his filing for bankruptcy. 
POINT II 
THE OBLIGATIONS SUED UPON BY 
THE RESPONDENT 'VERE NOT IN THE 
~ATURE OF PROPERTY SETTLEMENT 
AG-REEl\IENTS AND THE COURT DID NOT 
ERR 'VHEN IT FOUND THAT SUCH OBLI-
GATIONS 'VERE FOR SUPPORT AND l\IAIN-
TENANCE OF THE RESPONDENT, THAT 
StTCH OBLIGATIONS 'VERE NOT DIS-
CHARGED BY THE BANKRUPTCY PRO-
CEEDINGS. 
There is no question but what an agreement was 
made in this case, later being embodied in a written 
stipulation and then in the Divorce Decree. Respondent 
differs from the Appellant's interpretation in that the 
payments were always considered by the Respondent 
to be essential for her solvency and living. She had no 
job, was unskilled and had no income except from 
:1ocial security, which was barely enough to make ends 
meet. She should not possibly have paid these family 
obligations. This was not the settlement of a simple 
O'.::bt, but the agreement converted it into a contract 
fr·r maintenance and support. 
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Another factor is also significant. Appellant 
promised, under the terms of the stipulation and di-
Yorce decree, to "saye Plaintiff (Respondent) harm-
less from any suit or action" appertaining to these three 
family obligations. In Appellant's answer filed in the 
District Court, and which is a part of the record nm1 
before the Court in the appeal, the Defendant (Ap-
pellant) admitted in each of these three causes of actiou 
that this "save harmless" provision would apply. Re-
spondeut maintains that this "save harmless" provision 
is an additional reason why these obligations \\'ere debts 
not pro-rnble in bankruptcy since the "save harmless" 
clause \rnuld not take effect until the principal obli-
gations were actually discharged by bankruptcy and 
Respondent had paid or assumed them. 
The case of Steele v. Georgia Fina nee, Inc., .5::3 Ua. 
App. 5-t.a, 8G S.E.580, states: 
"A debt which is not provable is not discharge-
able in bankruptcy. Thus. the obligation of a 
surety on a forthcoming bond is not a provable 
debt. and hence not dischargeable in bankruptcy, 
where the petition in bankruptcy of the Surety 
was filed before the bre~ich of the bond." 
Numerous cases ha Ye held that settlement agree-
ments in diYorce cases may be considered as mainten-
ance and support, and therefore not dischargeable. 
Some of these cases are as follows: 
In Poolman v. Poolman ( C.A. 8th, 1961) 289 F 
(2nd) 332, the Court held : 
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"that a state Court judgment against a hus-
hand enforcing the terms of a property settle-
ment whereby the husband was to make the nec-
essary payments on a note secured by '·a trust 
deed on the home which she had been awarded 
,~.:as a non-dischargeable debt since the obliga-
tion to maintain and support a family 'includes 
the obligation to keep a roof onr their heads.' " 
In a case similar to Poolman and following its doc-
trine, the Court said: 
"that while household furniture and an auto-
mobile (payments on which were required to be 
made by the diYorce agreement) may not be 
quite so basic as a roof over the wife's head, they 
partake of the same nature." In re Baldwin 
(D. Neb. HW6) 2.50 F. Supp. 533. 
Henson v. Henson, ~Io. App. 1963, 366 S.W. 2nd 
1, states: 
""There property settlement agreement is sub-
stantially for alimony, maintenance or support, 
husband's obligation thereunder is not discharge-
able in bankruptcy, and such is true even though 
property rights are adjusted between the parties 
for the purpose of furnishing that support." 
Also: 
"It is not only alimony and maintenance in 
conventional form that is not released by a dis-
charge in bankruptcy, but all obligations for 
maintenance and support of wife or child, 
whether denominated alimony or maintenance 
by statute or created by agreement of the par-
ties." 
U.S. In re Adams, C.C.A. N.Y. 25 F. 2nd 640, 
states: 
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"A husband's deht, under contract before 1li-
vorce to pay annuity to his wife, is not released 
by discharge, being 'liability for maintenauee 
of wife'." 
U.S. In re Runge, D.C. N.Y. 15 F. Supp. 31, 
states: 
"'Vhere separation agreement obligated hus-
band to pay wife lump sum i11 monthly install-
ments and gave wife right to declare all install-
ments due on default in one installment, and 
wife obtained judgment for all installmenb on 
default, full amount due under agreement was 
due her for maintenance at her death, and hence, 
no part of Judgment was dischargeable in bank-
ruptcy." 
N.Y. D'Andria Y. Hegeman, 2 N.Y.S. 2nd 832, 
253 App. DiY.518, motion denied, 4 N.Y.S. 2nd 376, 
25.J. App. DiY. 662, affirmed in N.E. 2nd 294, 278 N.Y. 
630, quotes: 
",\n agreement whereby husband promised to 
pay former ,,ife stated sum b~- weekly payments 
in discharge of debt, and also in lieu of payments 
for maintenance and support was contract for 
maintenance or support of wife unaffected by 
his discharge, notwithstanding benefits inure to 
wife's estate on her death, since payments were 
not payments of simple debt." 
In Re Alcorn (D.C. Cal. 1958) 162 F. Supp. 206, 
CCI-I Dec. 59, 285, states: 
"A bankrupt's alimony liability to his former 
wife, since the agreement entered into at tht 
time of the di.-orce and denominated 'property 
settlement agreement', is one which emborlie~, 
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withm its terms the common-law or statutory 
duty, and consequently is essentially a contrac't 
for maintenance and support." 
Again we wish to emphasize that the facts of this 
particular case would take the stipulation out of the 
~imple debt or property settlement category and make 
it a contract for support and maintenance. While the 
dirnrce was granted to the appellant, he was able to 
obtain it only after negotiations and agreement with 
Respondent. Thus Appellant's repeated statements in 
his brief that because he obtained the divorce the "Court 
was not obligated to make any award for support" (Tr./1 . .i. 
p. 8. 21) are obviously in error. 
The Court's Findings of Fact entered on April 7, 
196 7, and signed by Judge l\!Ia urice Harding held : 
( 5) ... "Said obligation incurred originally for siding 
for Plaintiff's home at Lehi, Utah, is for maintenance 
anrl support of Defendant's wife, and is not a provable 
debt which would be dischargable under Section 17 of 
the Federal Bankruptcy Act." 
That the obligation for a set of encyclopedias and 
television set is: ( 7) . . . "for maintenance and sup-
port of Defendant's wife in the manner to which Plain-
tiff was accustomed, and is not a provable debt which 
would be discharged under Section 17 of the Federal 
Bankruptcy Act." 
(9) ... said obligation is for maintenance and 
support of Defendant's wife in the nature of a neces-
5ar~· family vehicle, and is not a provable debt which 
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would be dischargeable under Section 17 of the Federal 
Bankruptcy Act.'' 
The aboYe stated Findings of Fact were supported 
by abundant competent evidence. 
Over the years it has been the consistent ruling 
of the Court that the Supreme Court cannot disturb 
the trial Court Findings of Fact if there is any com-
petent evidence to support the Findings. 
Nagle v. Club Fontainbleau, 405 P.2d 346, 17 Ctah 
2nd, 125: 
"Pr::sumptions are in fovor of Trial Court's 
Findings and .T udgment, and burden is on ap-
pellant to show to contrary.'' ! 
lVeight v. ·Miller, 396 P.2d 626, 16 Utah 2nd. 112: 1 
"Findings and J udgml'.nt supported by sub-
stantial evidence cannot properly be disturbed." 
Lake v. Pinder, 368 P.:2nd 593, 13 Utah 2nd.76. 
"If there is substantial evidence furnishing 
rrn:.;onable basis in support of lower Court's 
Findings, when eYidence is viewed most favor-
able to Findings, Judgment based thereon must 
be affirmed." 
Thorley v. Kolob Fish & Game Club, 373 P.2nd 
574, 13 Utah 2nd. 294: 
"Reviewing Court could not disturb Findings 
supported by substantial evidence." 
Lowe v. Rosenlof, 364 P.2nd. 418, 12 Utah 2nd 
190: 
"Court's :F'indin.as of Fact will not be disturbed ,.., ' 
as long as they are supported by substantial evi-
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dence, and Findings of lower Court must be 
affirmed unless there is no reasonable basis in evi-
dence." 
See also the following cases: 
Charlton v. Hackett, 360 P.2nd. 176, II Utah 2nd. 
389: 
Parrish v. Tahtaras, 318 P.2nd. 642, 7 Utah 2nd. 
87: 
Dalton v. Dalton, 307 P.2nd 894, 6 Utah 2nd. 136, 
l\Ialstrom v. Consolidated Theatres, 290 P.2nd. 
689, 4 Utah 2nd. 181. 
It has been further held in Rummell v. Bailey, 320 
P.2nd. 653, 7 Utah 2nd. 138, that: 
"Upon review of determination of issues of 
Fact, all the e,·idence and every inference and 
intendment fairly arising therefrom should be 
taken in the light most favorable to the Finding 
made by the Trial Court. And if when so viewed, 
there is substantial support in the evidence for 
the Finding made, it should not be disturbed." 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons herein stated, the Judgment of the 
Lower Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HARV ARD R. HINTON 
Attorney for Respondent 
46 West Main 
Lehi, Utah 
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